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I. Introduction 
 
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Union temporarily occupied North 
Korea, which possessed most of the natural resources and industrial facilities of Korea at that 
time, and the United Stated temporarily occupied South Korea, whose major economic source 
was agriculture. The conflict between North and South Korea led to the three-year Korean 
War, which destroyed the nation’s meager industrial facilities. As a result, the South Korean 
economy was not able to be maintained without aid and loans from the United States during 
the 1950s and 1960s. South Korea’s GDP per capita in 1960 was $68, one of the lowest in the 
world, and poverty was rampant, with more than 80% of Koreans living under poverty line. 
In 1963, the population of South Korea was 24 million, there were as many as 2.5 million 
people unemployed, and the number of companies which had more than 200employees was 
only fifty four (Huh 2009); therefore, job opportunities at that time were extremely limited. 
The nation also had almost none of the three necessary elements for economic growth – 
natural resources, industrial facilities, and capital. 
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Starting in 1962, Korea’s economic development strategy was to import raw materials, 
manufacture goods domestically, and then export the finished products. While most newly 
independent countries were pursuing economic growth through the production of import-
substituting goods, Korea focused on overseas’ markets and aggressively pursued an export-
oriented growth strategy. By taking advantage of the world market and trade liberalization in 
the world economy, Korea had become one of the leading developing countries in the early 
1990s. The GDP per capita had increased from $82 in 1962 to $6,412 in 1990, and the rate of 
unemployment had dropped from 8.1% in 1963 to 2.4% in 1990. In addition, the number of 
companies that had more than 200 employees had increased to more than 2,500, and quite a 
few companies were beginning to complain of a shortage of labor supplies. 
During the development era of 1962 to 1987, the government suppressed the radical labor 
movement in order to concentrate all the available resources on economic development, and 
policies related to collective labor relations were very restrictive. Labor strikes were rarely 
allowed, although long working hours and low wages were common practice at that time. In 
contrast to this, policies regarding individual employment relations were relatively generous. 
For example, it was required by law that workers were to receive 50% more than their normal 
wages when working overtime, and worker allowances equivalent to 70% or more of their 
wages were to be given during periods when businesses were suspended. The legacy of these 
policies remains part of the current Labor Standards Act. 
During this development period, the government had not introduced any institution of 
social protection system except for Work Injury Compensation Insurance, which was 
introduced in 1964. It wasn’t until 1977 that the National Health Insurance Plan was initiated. 
Before this time, the government demanded that individual companies be responsible for the 
protection of their employees. Thus, employers were obliged to pay family allowance to their 
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employees according to the number of the supported family members as well as severance 
pay to employees who left either voluntarily or involuntarily if they had worked at the 
company more than one year continuously. The severance pay played the role of 
unemployment benefits on the one hand and the role of pensions on the other hand when the 
National Pension and Unemployment Insurance schemes did not exist. 
During this time, the main duty of the former Labor Administration, now called the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor, was to prevent labor disputes. They were also partially 
involved in the management of the Work Injury Compensation Insurance plan, which was 
introduced in 1964, and operated teams which supported the dispatch of labor to Germany in 
1960s and to the Middle East in the latter part of the 1970s. At that time, the focus of 
employment policy was on job creation through high growth (Ministry of Labor 2006b: 36). 
The main contents of the Development Plans were composed of strategies to develop new 
industries so that they would absorb excess labor in the agricultural sector and turn the 
workers in existent industries to new industries with high productivity. In fact, the high 
growth rate of 9.4% created over 440 thousand additional jobs per year on average without 
deteriorating income distribution in the 1970s and 1980s. This virtuous circle of growth and 
employment with reasonable income distribution relieved the Korean economy of concern 
about ‘active’ labor market policies and social protection needs and maintained the firm-
based welfare system. 
It was only in the 1990s that the concept of an active labor market policy in a proper sense 
came into the employment policy area with the introduction of the Employment Insurance 
System (EIS). Before, the mainstream of the institutionalized labor market policy program 
was regarding training policies to meet the skills requested by newly developed industries. In 
part, there were considerations on public employment service, but few resources were 
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allocated and the number of agencies, staff and financial resources fell short of implementing 
public employment service in a proper sense. Policies against unemployment frequently 
appealed to ad hoc public works programs for low income families rather than dealt with 
unemployment benefits or assistance. 
In this paper, the author will discuss the evolution of Korea’s labor market institutions 
from the viewpoint of how the concept of active labor market’s policies was introduced and 
finalized. To this end, the author will examine Korea’s employment policy before active 
labor market policies were explicitly established and the birth and development of the EIS. 
The paper is organized in the following manner: Section II will examine changes in the labor 
market condition and the evolution of employment policy. Section III will discuss the birth of 
the EIS. Section IV looks at the settlement and development of the EIS. Finally, Section V 
will summarize the key points of the paper and discuss its implications for developing 
countries which seek for relevant labor market institutions. 
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II. Changes in the Labor Market Condition and the Evolution of Employment Policy 
 
1. The 1970s: The provision of skills for heavy and chemical industrialization in the 
light industry economy 
 
A historical look at the process of economic development reveals that, during the transition 
from an agricultural to an industrial economy, the supply of unskilled labor is almost 
unlimited at the subsistence wage level (Lewis 1954). In the 1960s to mid-1970s, continuing 
migration from rural to urban areas provided a seemingly endless pool of workers for the 
urban industrial sector. It was in the mid-70s that the unlimited supply of labor ended in 
Korea (Bae 1982).  
Up to that point in time, the main industrial products in Korea included wigs, shoes, and 
plywood, all of which were produced by labor-intensive industries that were able to function 
solely with unskilled labor. This labor force could be obtained primarily from vocational 
schools, public training centers established via international aid programs and loans from 
ADB and IBRD, and other training facilities recognized by the government. The primary 
labor market at that time was the modern industrial sector in urban areas, where the demand 
for production workers was met by the supply of workers with basic skills and the 
widespread underemployed workforce in the urban peripheral areas constituted the secondary 
labor market, providing a backup resource of potential labor supply for the primary market.  
From 1975 on, the elasticity of labor supply reduced considerably, wages grew to two 
digits, the relative wages of production workers increased, and the labor share and job 
vacancy ratio increased sharply (Bae 1982). Even though the elasticity of employment in the 
manufacturing industry reduced due to the weight of the economy moving from a labor 
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intensive light industry to a more capital intensive heavy and chemical industry, overall 
employment increased as a result of the high growth rates of manufacturing, which amounted 
to 16.2% per annum, and a construction boom both in the domestic market and construction 
worker export to the Middle East. Along with this change in industrial structure, employment 
in the urban informal sector continuously decreased, and a labor shortage arose partially in 
the construction industry, which led to a dramatic increase in wages. 
 
Figure 1. The number of trained workers and mandatory training ratio 
(Unit: persons, %, ‰) 
 
Note: The mandatory ratio is a percentage ratio of the number of effective workers until 
1986 and a per mille ratio of the total wage bill from 1987. 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Current Status of Vocational Training Plan. 
 
The core of employment policy in this period was a vocational training plan. The main 
feature of the plan was a mandatory training program which requested large firms to train a 
certain number of workers. The firms had to train the number of workers which amounted to 
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by the government (the ratios in Figure 1).1 Those firms which failed to train the notified 
number of workers had to pay a levy which amounted to the training cost of the equivalent 
number of workers. 
 
2. The 1980s: The rapid transformation of the industrial structure and emergence of 
labor shortage  
 
In 1980, the unemployment rate surged to 5.2% due to a severe recession which resulted 
from the “second oil shock.” In addition, because of an overinvestment in the facilities for 
shipbuilding and chemical industries during the second half of the 1970s, this heavy and 
chemical industry sector had to go through restructuring in the early 1980s. However, the 
economy and employment could achieve stability due to ‘real wage flexibility’ and the 
resulting increase in competitiveness in international markets (Bruno and Sachs 1985). In 
other words, even though a period of unlimited supply of labor came to an end in the mid-
1970s, the domestic labor supply could meet the demand for labor, including skilled 
production workers, without much difficulty until the early 1980s. 
From 1987, due to a drop in the price of oil and the international interest rate and a relative 
decline in the value of the Korean Won against the Japanese Yen, Korea’s exporting 
competitiveness greatly increased and the Korean economy experienced the so-called “3-Low 
Boom.” In effect, Korea had been importing intermediate materials and financed investment 
                                           
1 The mandate, first introduced in 1975, was extended to firms with at least 300 employees in 1977, those with 
at least 200 employees in 1989, and those with at least150 employees in 1992. With the introduction of the 
Employment Insurance System in 1995 the mandate was applied only to those firms with at least 1000 
employees until 1998, and it was abolished in 1999, being integrated fully to the Job Skill Development Pillar of 
the EIS. The percentage of the number of workers mandatorily trained was 5.7% in 1977, 6.2% in 1978, 6.7% in 
1979, 3.14% in 1980, 4.13% in 1981 and 2.44 in 1982. Afterwards it was in the interval of 1.63-1.78 between 
1983 and 1986. From 1987, the regulation on mandatory training changed from the ratio of the number of 
effective workers to a per mille ratio of the total wage bill (Figure 1). 
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capital by borrowing loans from the world financial market instead of inviting foreign direct 
investment, and more and more goods were beginning to compete with Japanese export 
goods in the world market. An accelerating tendency toward free trade in the world market 
combined with this “3-Low” phenomenon enabled the Korean economy to consolidate itself 
further and the labor market to experience its largest change in the 1980s. 
With a significant growth of employment in the manufacturing and service industries 
which increased by 6.0% and 5.1% per annum respectively, the rate of unemployment 
dropped to under 3% from 1988. The political democratization, which started in 1987, 
encouraged workers’ claims for rights that had been suppressed up to that point. As a 
consequence, the rate of wages increased to the double digits from 1987 while the rate of 
inflation remained in the single digits and the purchasing power of workers’ wages increased 
rapidly (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Growth rate of labor productivity, real wages and nominal wages 
(Unit: %) 
  
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Establishment Labor Force Survey. 
Bank of Korea, National Account. 
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This was also an era when general employment condition had improved and labor 
shortages emerged as an issue in the labor market. The labor market experienced a 
disequilibrium and at the same time a conflict between workers and companies. Due to these 
changes, a policy initiative of not only raising the participation of women and elderly workers 
but also inviting foreign workers was seriously considered. The participation rate of women 
aged 15-64 increased from 45.1% in 1981 to 47.9% in 1988 and then to 49.9% in 1990, but 
this was far lower than other industrialized countries. 
Large corporations, which were able to procure financial resources for investment with 
relative ease through export financing, invested on a large scale and hired a number of 
workers regularly under long-term growth perspectives. These companies recruited regularly 
in order to maintain a quality workforce. As a result, the employment of young workers 
increased without precedent as well as the employment rate of elderly workers (Hur and 
Cheon 1998). Therefore, by 1991 the number of wage workers and, in particular, the 
proportion of regular employees increased sharply until 1993 (Figure 3). 
From 1981, universities and college were allowed to accommodate almost twice as many 
students following educational reform by the new government, and the pool of highly 
educated employees increased, on the other hand the supply of production workers reduced, 
causing a rapid increase in the relative wages of production workers. However, the gap in 
productivity and wages between companies of different sizes began to widen after 1988. In 
addition, SMEs could not afford wage levels as high as those of large companies. Once 
qualified, workers moved from SMEs to large enterprises. This led to a shortage of 
production workers in small and medium-sized businesses.  
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Figure 3. Ratio of regular workers among wage workers and wage workers among 
total employment 
(Unit: %) 
  
Source: Statistics Korea, Economically Active Population Survey. 
 
Large enterprises were taking advantage of an enlarged international market and growing 
rapidly. Banks allocated credit to large firms, which were thought to be risk-free. Large 
enterprises procured the financial resources for investment in the capital market to the extent 
they wanted. In this way, large enterprises could absorb highly qualified workers. These 
changes in the production market and capital market from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s 
brought about a manpower disequilibrium and widened the wage gap between large and 
small to medium-sized companies. 
The main basis of the employment policy in 1980s also consisted of a supply of manpower 
with relevant skills. A mandatory training-or-levy policy was maintained. However, the 
mandatory training ratio was lowered to less than 2 percent or per mille (Figure 1). At first, 
the objective of lowering the ratio was to relieve firms of labor cost burdens. In the second 
half of 1980s, however, policies reflected the condition of training in the labor market, where 
on-the-job training increased due to an economic boom, while off-the-job training was 
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diminishing. Also, the government allowed more autonomy by relaxing strict regulations on 
training contents and admitted diversification of training programs (Ministry of Labor 2006b: 
256). 
 
3. The 1990s: An increase in the demand for skilled labor with high adaptability, shift of 
HRM norms in firms, and the establishment of ALMP 
  
The trade liberalization that had spread worldwide since the 1980s put more pressure on 
competition in the international market in the 1990s. On top of this, the pressure by OECD 
countries to open Korean capital markets became more severe. At this time, domestic demand 
for goods and services rose due to an increase in the purchasing power of workers, so the 
dependence on trade in the economy was at its lowest point since 1973. The dependency ratio 
reduced from 65.7% in 1987 to 52.7% in 1993. In addition, a deficit in the trade balance 
continued despite a rise in the exchange rate. In addition, the government started to open its 
capital market, which was one of the causes of the financial crisis in 1997. 
Information and communication technology began to proliferate around 1993 in Korea, 
and its diffusion accelerated in 1997 (Hur, Seo and Lee 2002). As the pressure on 
competition in the international market and the impact of technological progress expanded, 
transformations in organizational structure and job security took place as well. Within 
organizations that primarily hired full-time employees, the diversification of job 
responsibilities, increased autonomy of employees, and decentralization of the decision- 
making process began to occur. Once the need to ensure the flexibility of the organizational 
restructuring and decision-making process became a focus, employment trends became 
destabilized and the relative wages of unskilled and non-regular workers decreased. 
Accordingly, overall income distribution began to worsen (Figure 4). With the advance of 
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information technologies, subordinate workers were able to obtain access to much 
information and knowledge, and it was possible for senior managers to have direct control 
over more employees than ever before. Thus, the role of middle management as a liaison 
between top management and bottom line workers gradually diminished, and the use of team 
units became commonplace in companies. 
  
Figure 4. Evolution of the poverty ratio and Gini coefficient 
 
Source: Statistics Korea, Household Expenditure Survey; Calculation by Yoo (2009). 
 
The establishment of intra-networks using information and communication technologies 
gradually led to the dissembling of the traditional vertical hierarchy of organizations, and the 
demand for middle management and general administration officials decreased accordingly. 
On the other hand, the demand for executives, professional, experienced and skilled workers 
requiring high cognitive skills rose. The advancement of the dissemination of information 
technology brought asymmetrical fluxes in the labor market depending on the nature of the 
labor. As a result, employees with simple, repetitive work duties experienced both job 
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insecurity and a relative reduction in wages; employees that performed jobs requiring a 
higher level of cognitive skills also experienced job insecurity but at the same time saw an 
expansion of their autonomy in the workplace (Hur 2004; Seo, Hur and Lee 2004). The 
financial crisis in 1997 provided momentum which rapidly worsened job security and income 
distribution. This crisis also accelerated a change in the paradigm of the personnel 
management of companies, and the adverse effects of the existing job insecurity spread to the 
entire Korean economy. While the demand for highly adaptable labor increased significantly, 
the low-skilled, labor-intensive sector depended on production line outsourcing or non-
regular workers. Also flexible employment relations prevailed in the name of ‘management 
by team.’ 
Figure 5 shows the education-, occupation-, and age-related wage differentials between 
1990 and 2001. Up until 1998, the education premium fell, but started to rise considerably 
starting in 1999. The earnings ratio of different occupation groups shows a similar pattern to 
changes in the education premium, which fell until 1998, and rose thereafter. (‘High-skilled 
occupation’ is defined as ISCED skill level 3 and 4, and ‘low-skill occupation group’ is 
defined as ISCED skill level 1 and 2 of ISCO-88). Non-production/production worker 
earnings and age-related wage differentials widened from 1995. The earnings ratio between 
core age worker and the youth also increased from 1998. 
This happened with the rising employment share of the high-skill occupation group while 
the employment share of young workers was falling. With the last cohort of the baby-
boomers (those born in the first half of 1970s) already having joined the working age 
population by 1990, fewer and fewer young people went into the labor market throughout the 
1990s. Therefore, like changes in the education and occupation wage differentials, the supply 
trends of young workers went against the rising wage differentials of prime-age workers. 
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These patterns were robust even though other factors that constituted traditional wage 
equations were controlled. 
 
Figure 5. Between-group wage gaps (logarithm of hourly earnings) 
 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor, Wage Structure Survey; Cited from 
Hur(2003). 
 
Due to labor shortages which emerged in the late 1980s and the mismatches in the labor 
market which had worsened in the early 1990s among the workforce, discussions became 
active to introduce an active labor market policy. The government started to review the 
introduction of the Employment Insurance System (EIS) in 1992, and the EIS was introduced 
in July, 1995.  
However, the number of workers who were to be enrolled in the EIS was limited to 4.3 
million among 13.0 million employees. The coverage of the UI component of the EIS was 
limited to businesses with 30 or more employees because the administration capacity was 
deemed insufficient to manage all the wage workers. Traditionally, the Korean government 
introduced social protection schemes with a growth in the economy, but the schemes initially 
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covered a limited range of workers until the administration capacity was stabilized. In fact, 
the coverage of the Work Injury Compensation Insurance introduced in 1964, the National 
Health Insurance introduced in 1977, and the National Pension introduced in 1988 was 
limited to businesses that had five or more employees before the financial crisis in 1997. As 
for the National Health Insurance and the National Pension, those excluded workers in small 
firms could be covered under the title of self-employed, but they were simply excluded from 
protection as for the Work Injury Compensation Insurance and EIS due to the fact that these 
two social insurance schemes were, by nature, targeting only wage workers. 
The financial crisis was a turning point in the expansion of the social insurance system. 
This system swiftly expanded because of the urgent need to secure a social safety net (Hur 
and Kim 2002). The expanse of this social safety net was emphasized as a means of tackling 
the issue of high unemployment, which had risen rapidly directly on the heels of the financial 
crisis, and a way of better protecting workers. The launch of the EIS meant an establishment 
of the ALMP institution and became a momentum in the large scale investment in PES. At 
first, labor market participants felt unfamiliar with unemployment benefits, public job 
placement services, and subsidies provided by the EIS, but they soon began to take advantage 
of them after the financial crisis in 1997. 
 
4. The 2000s: A limited employment growth, large-scale direct job creation policy and 
the introduction of ‘activation’ programs 
 
After the financial crisis, the concept of risk management was introduced into the financial 
market. Traditionally, loans to Chaebeol (large conglomerates) firms meant no risk to 
financial institutions because Chaebeol had never undergone bankruptcy. However, while 
overcoming the crisis, insolvant Chaebol firms were closed or sold with debt write-offs. 
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Financial institutions themselves had to undergo closedowns or restructurings. Now, banks 
began to screen loans to firms and became conservative in lending. Companies proactively 
sought to secure a cash flow as well as a significant reduction in the investment rate.  
In addition, with liberalized foreign direct investment, new norms were enforced in firms’ 
management and investment decisions. Firms were obliged to respect share-holders’ interests 
and had to allocate more on dividends than on internal reserves or new investments. A 
tendency to emphasize shareholders’ interests pushed companies to seek a maximization of 
short-term returns rather than long-term returns. Adjusting and streamlining employment 
became a new practice in the labor market, and companies’ compensation systems and 
investments in training were mainly provided to high-skilled workers, a practice which 
further widened the wage gap between workers. 
This change in macroeconomic climate limited the growth of individual companies as well 
as the creation of jobs, and the labor market went through changes in standards once again 
after the mid-1970s. The average annual growth rate of the Korean economy during the thirty 
five years prior to the financial crisis had been 8.3%. It decreased to 4.3% during the period 
of 1998 to 2010 and the annual employment increase had declined from 430 thousand to 20 
thousand. 
The importance of a social safety net was emphasized, but even after the dust from the 
crisis had settled, requests for improvement of the social safety net continued in the 2000s 
because the structure of labor demand tended to increase employment insecurity, and a 
polarization of income distribution while the social insurance system did not protect those 
disadvantaged workers effectively. Moreover, the role of government transfer contributed 
little to mitigating aggravated income distribution. 
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While streamlining those policy programs against unemployment which were introduced 
during overcoming the financial crisis in 1997, the Korean economy experienced jobless 
growth in 2003; the GDP growth rate amounted to as much as 2.8%, but employment went 
backwards, recording a growth rate of -0.1%. This was received as a shock to the government, 
which pushed pushed job creation programs and created 520 thousand jobs annually by 
public finance, not only public-work project programs but also jobs in the social service area 
were supplied. From 2008, the new government intended to reduce those direct job creation 
programs, but the programs were expanded to cope with the financial crisis in 2008.  
In 2008, an activation program named the ‘Job Finding Success Package’ was introduced 
to care proactively for those workers in blind spots of the EIS and job seekers from low 
income families. This was a program based on a mutual obligation between job seekers and 
the government. In 2008, the Ministry of Employment and Labor prepared the ‘Package’ for 
15 thousand job seekers and in 2012 this increased to 200 thousand job seekers. 
 
The labor market transformed in accordance to changes in the economic structure, and the 
potential of job creation was determined by characteristics of the labor market. During the 
last forty years, the labor market and employment conditions had gone through continuous 
changes, and the issues had changed accordingly. A summary of these changes in labor 
conditions and policies are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Labor market condition and corresponding policies 
  1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Main Economic 
Phenomena 
High Inflation; 
The Oil Shocks 
Low inflation; 
Economic boom due 
to 3- lows*; 
Trade surplus; 
Increased higher 
education (autonomy 
of recruitment in 
colleges and 
universities) 
Increased international 
competition; 
Capital market 
liberalization;  
Accelerated 
technological advances; 
Rapid increase in 
productivity 
Risk management in the 
financial institution; 
Shareholder-oriented 
management;  
Decrease in investment 
and growth rate 
 
Core Industries  Light industries Heavy and chemical industries 
High value-added 
manufacturing industries 
Converged and 
integrated information 
and communications 
technology industry 
Main Labor 
market 
Phenomena 
Fade-out of urban 
informal sector and 
underemployment 
Wage increase of 
production workers; 
Appearance of labor 
shortage 
Wage increase in high 
skilled jobs; 
Labor shortage in 3D 
jobs* 
Lack of Jobs, especially 
for youth;  
Expanded wage gap 
between large companies 
and SMEs;  
Reduction of self-
employed sector 
Key demand for 
labor 
Production workers 
with basic skills 
Skilled production 
workers High-skilled workers 
High-skilled workers 
with high adaptability 
and multiple skills 
Primary labor 
market 
Modern industrial 
sector employees 
Employees in large 
firms and growing 
industries 
Employees in large firms Unionized regular employees in large firms 
Major 
Employment 
Policy 
Supply of production 
workers through 
vocational training 
institutions; 
mandatory training-
or -levy policy to 
large firms; 
Public work 
programs  
More autonomy for 
firms’ training; 
Policy programs to 
utilize potential labor 
force such as women 
and senior citizens 
UI, investment on PES; 
Raise of training ratio; 
 
Invitation of foreign 
workers;  
Regulations on 
dispatched workers 
PES upgrading; 
Introduction of 
‘activation’ program; 
Public financed job 
creation; 
Employment permit 
system; 
Regulations for non-
regular worker use 
Recruitment and 
Adjustment of 
Labor in Firms 
Proactive recruitment in preparation for 
business expansion 
Adjusting employment 
by voluntary early 
retirement 
Employment adjustment 
depending on economic 
condition 
Human Resource 
Management 
Keeping manpower reserves in preparation 
for future growth; 
Recruiting regularly to procure quality 
workers; 
Overcoming recession by wage flexibility 
 
Reserving suitable level 
of manpower 
Reserving core workers 
only; 
Outsourcing non-core 
workers 
Hiring mainly 
experienced employees 
Personnel 
Organization Hierarchical decision making 
Introduction team-
operating systems 
Common practice of 
team-operating systems 
Note: 1) Three lows in ‘Economic boom due to 3-lows’ is a jargon describing low oil price, low interest rate in 
the international capital market and low exchange rate, the phenomena observed in late 1980s. 
2) ‘3D jobs’ is a jargon designating dangerous, dirty, demanding jobs 
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III. Birth of the EIS 
 
1. Prehistory of discussions on unemployment insurance 
 
In the 1970s, the Labor Office compiled several reports on the need to introduce 
unemployment insurance. Two documents, each titled “Review on the Introduction of 
Unemployment Insurance,” thought to be compiled in 1974 and 1978 respectively, were 
submitted to the head of the Labor Office at the time, but they were not shared with any other 
government bodies or the public (Yoo 2011). The system that was reviewed for possible 
introduction was not the type of EIS which is currently in effect but was closer to a European 
type of unemployment insurance or assistance. 
After the second oil shock, the Korean economy went through a severe recession in 1979 
and 1980. This economic recession, combined with political instability, resulted in a high 
unemployment rate in the early 1980s. The non-agricultural unemployment rate reached 5.6% 
in 1979, 7.5% in 1980, and 6.5% in 1981. The Ministry of Labor, which had been upgraded 
from the Labor Office, officially requested that the Economic Planning Board introduce an 
unemployment insurance system. As a result of this request, the Economic Planning Board 
and the Ministry of Labor started a formal review of the introduction of unemployment 
insurance within the context of revising the fifth Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (Ministry of Labor 2006). However, many concerns were raised at that time. 
Among them were concerns over labor costs, the immature industrial structure, the 
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overwhelming number of micro firms characterized by informality,2 a lack of administrative 
capacity, and possible moral hazards related with them. Objections from businesses were 
strong. In fact, Korea was offering a generous severance pay scheme which served part of the 
role of an unemployment benefit. The severance pay played two roles: providing income 
support to the unemployed and maintaining income security for the retired. In the inter-
governmental discussions, Ministries other than the Ministry of Labor and the presidential 
office objected to the introduction of unemployment insurance. It was decide that the 
unemployment insurance would not be during the era of the fifth Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development. 
However, in these discussions, a consensus began to emerge that a traditional 
unemployment insurance system which simply provided unemployment benefits after job 
loss was not appropriately relevant to the Korean labor market. It was also felt by some that 
these passive measures alone could not ensure a stable livelihood for workers, and that it was 
more important to prevent unemployment, improve the employment structure, and enhance 
the vocational competency of workers in a system that combined traditional unemployment 
insurance with vocational training and employment stabilization programs. To distinguish 
such a system from unemployment insurance, it was decided that this proactive system 
should be called “employment insurance.” Based on such consensus the terminology 
‘employment insurance’ was used apart from ‘unemployment insurance’ in government 
circles from the early 1980s (Yoo 2011). 
  
                                           
2 In 1994, the proportion of workers in business establishments with 1-4[1-29] employees was in the order of 
17.0% [44.6%] of the total employees and 74.5%[95.6% ] of the total 9.4 million establishments. As of 2007, 
the proportion of workers in business with 1-4 [1-29] employees explained 17.3% [49.8%] of the total 
employees and 68.5%[95.4% ] of the total number of establishments which amounted to 11.0 million. In early 
1980s, the proportions micro or small firms must have been comparable to that of 1994 or 2007 while the total 
number of establishments was much smaller. 
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2. Launching of the EIS 
 
Up until early 1991, negative opinions about the introduction of unemployment insurance 
were still widespread within the government. On March 37, 1991, however, “The Need to 
Introduce Employment Insurance and Directions for its Introduction,” was presented by Dr. 
Yoo Kil-Sang of the Korea Labor Institute, who had worked in the Economic Planning Board, 
before high officials from the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Labor, and it 
was agreed in ensuing discussions at the working level that the EIS would be introduced 
within the period of the seventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. At 
this point, the Korean government started to actively review the introduction of the EIS in 
establishing the seventh Five-Year Plan. Finally, members of the Economic Ministers’ 
Meeting of August 23, 1991 made the decision that the EIS would be introduced in the latter 
half of the period covered by the seventh Five-Year Plan (Yoo 2011). 
With its decision to introduce the EIS, the Korean government sought to develop an 
employment insurance model suiting the particular circumstances of the Korean economy 
and therefore established the Employment Insurance Research Task Force within the Korea 
Labor Institute in March, 1992 to research employment insurance models. This task force, 
which consisted of thirty scholars, analyzed the characteristics of the Korean labor market 
and the structure of unemployment in Korea and engaged in comparative analyses of the 
unemployment insurance system and labor market programs in major countries to develop an 
employment insurance model suitable for the situation in Korea. The results were compiled 
into “A Proposed Employment Insurance System for Korea,” which was submitted to the 
government on May 18, 1993 (Ministry of Labor 2006). 
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Based on this proposal, the Ministry of Labor proceeded to draft an Employment Insurance 
Bill and the government collected opinions from academia, labor, and management, and held 
a public hearing on the Bill with participation from labor and management groups and other 
stakeholders. The bill was unanimously passed by the plenary of the National Assembly. In 
April, 1994, the government established the Employment Insurance Division within the 
Ministry of Labor to prepare for its implementation. The Ministry of Labor worked to 
legislate rules, regulations, guidelines, and notices needed for the compilation and 
implementation of a work manual in order to revamp the organization, hire personnel, and 
conduct preliminary training for regional labor offices responsible for frontline operations as 
well as to develop and test computer programs that would support the collection of insurance 
premiums, the management of enrollees, and the payment of unemployment benefits. 
Eventually, Korea introduced the Employment Insurance System on July 1, 1995. This 
system consisted of three components: unemployment insurance (UI), job training, and 
employment maintenance/promotion subsidies. Owing to a limited administrative capacity, 
only workers in firms with 30 or more employees were initially covered. As a result, the 
fourth pillar of the Korean social insurance system, the EIS, was established, the other three 
being the Work Injury Compensation Insurance, National Health Insurance, and National 
Pension. 
 
3. Changes in the vocational training system and public employment services 
 
With the introduction of the EIS, the unemployment benefit and employment subsidies fell 
into the category of labor market policy. Besides, the vocational training system and public 
employment service went through remarkable changes with the introduction of the EIS. The 
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existing vocational training system, which focused on initial training for skilled workers in 
manufacturing, was converted into a lifelong vocational competency development system.  
Under the ‘Basic Act on Vocational Training,’ which regulated the old training system 
before the EIS was introduced, vocational training was provided mostly to nurture skills 
needed in the manufacturing sector, especially for non-enrolled youths. Under this system, 
the government trained production workers with basic skills while firms conducted 
mandatory vocational training in the form of in-house training. However, this compulsory in-
house training system lost its positive role as the labor market condition changed. Firms were 
demanding more skilled workers, and the training system had to change so that firms would 
be provided more autonomy in training workers.  
The Employment Insurance Act allowed for and induced firms to conduct in-house training 
voluntarily. With the implementation of the vocational competency development program, 
many more firms participated in vocational training than when the mandatory in-house 
training was in effect. The program promoted participation in a vocational competency 
development program and provided a foundation for a lifelong vocational competency 
development system.  
The UI component of the EIS and its accompanying need to administer the payment of 
unemployment benefits with a placement service required an improved infrastructure for 
public employment services. Employment centers had been established across the nation to 
administer UI-related operations and placement services. The internet-based labor market 
information system, Work-Net, was launched as part of such efforts. Before the EIS was 
introduced, Korea’s PES infrastructure was very poor, but the implementation of the EIS 
upgraded facilities for employment services. 
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IV. Development of the EIS 
 
1. The EIS before the financial crisis 
 
During the economic development era from 1962 to 1992, the Korean economy provided 
jobs through a high rate of growth without aggravating income distribution. The average 
economic growth of 8.6% per annum led to over a forty-four thousand job increase per year, 
and this job creation reduced poverty. In 1992, the Gini coefficient was no more than 0.245 
and relative poverty ration was 6.5%. From time to time, wage policy or income policy was 
enforced to attenuate inflation pressure. Instead, firms took over the welfare needs of workers. 
Among those benefits firms were responsible for was severance pay, which was often called 
retirement allowance as well.3 
Labor market participants were accustomed to benefits given via firms but not accustomed 
to demanding cash benefits from the government because the Korean people had never 
experienced such cash benefits in the form of public transfer prior to that time. In 1996 and 
1997, those unemployed eligible for unemployment benefits were relatively high-income 
earners due to the fact that coverage of the EIS was limited to those workers in businesses 
                                           
3 Severance-pay, otherwise called retirement allowance, is financed entirely by employers and is given to those 
who have worked at least one year in a company regardless of reasons of separation. The benefit level is one 
month’s salary per year’s service. Eligibility of the scheme has been limited to workers in companies of a 
certain size; it applied to companies with 30 employees or more in 1961 before the coverage was extended 
steadily to include workplaces with five or more employees in 1989. Since December 2010, it has applied to all 
companies with at least one employee. In many developing countries, whether or not a severance pay funded by 
the employers as a substitute for unemployment insurance restricts formal/regular employment generation is a 
contentious issue (see, for example, Heckman and Pages 2000 and Gruber 1995). The incidence of payroll tax 
and its impact on the demand for labor can be different depending on the labor market condition. Korean 
experience of severance pay is an interesting case because a strong (regular) employment growth has evolved 
hand-in-hand with generous severance pay. It is thought that Korea could achieve employment growth of 
regular workers even with the generous severance pay regulation, due to the high growth rate which might have 
surpassed the negative effect, if any, of the payroll taxation. 
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with at least 30 employees, and eligible persons who had satisfied eligibility conditions were 
mainly those who worked for large firms. The unemployed regarded it as shameful to visit 
public employment service agencies to declare and receive unemployment benefits. The total 
number of unemployment benefit recipients was not more than 7,200 in 1996 and 40,000 in 
1997. Applications for employment subsidies were negligible. In searching for jobs, 
individuals did not think of visiting public employment service agencies and continued to 
seek jobs via personal networks. According to a survey conducted in 1997, around 8% of job 
searchers reported utilizing public employment service agencies, while more than 30% of job 
searchers stated that they had searched for jobs via relatives, friends or other acquaintances.  
This response from the labor market to the EIS was far from what the Ministry of Labor 
had expected, to the extent that the government was embarrassed. The Ministry of Labor 
planned public relation campaigns to help make the EIS better understood by actual and 
potential labor market participants. However, the labor market turmoil following the financial 
crisis dispelled these worries and presented dramatically new challenges to the government. 
 
2. The financial crisis in 1997 and evolution of the EIS 
 
In November 1997, the Korean economy was hit by a devastating economic crisis. The 
following year, declining macroeconomic conditions brought about major disruptions in the 
labor market: a quadrupling of unemployment, a 9.0 percent fall in real wages, an 
informalization of remaining jobs,4 increased job insecurity, and rising poverty and inequality. 
Faced with high and continued increasing unemployment, people began to take advantage of 
the EIS and the Korean EIS contained diverse and intense measures to alleviate the adverse 
                                           
4 The proportion of regular workers fell from 54.3% in 1997 to 47.9% in 2000. 
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impacts of the crisis on the labor market. The key measures adopted can be classified into 
four categories: (1) unemployment benefits as a means of income support, (2) job training for 
reemployment, (3) employment subsidies for job maintenance and employment promotions 
for disadvantaged workers, and (4) public employment services and a labor market 
information system. 
 
1) The unemployment insurance component of the EIS 
With severe economic recession and massive unemployment, poverty among the jobless 
and low-income families emerged as a priority social issue that needed to be addressed 
immediately. Income support programs were implemented in two directions. First, in order 
for the EIS to care for as many unemployed people as possible, its coverage was extended, 
qualification requirements were relaxed, and UI beneficiaries were given up to 60 additional 
benefit days. Second, the low-income jobless were given an income or credit support such as 
loans for living expenses (including family’s medical and educational expenses) and other 
public aid benefits. 
When the EIS was first introduced, UI coverage was limited to workers employed at firms 
with 30 or more employees. In the face of rising unemployment and the growing 
unemployment vulnerability of low-wage earners at small size firms, the extension of UI 
coverage was deemed critical to expand the social protection of the unemployed. In response, 
the Korean government extended UI coverage to firms with 10 or more employees in January 
1998, to firms with 5 or more employees in March 1998, and finally, to all firms with at least 
one employee in October 1998 (Table 2). After these three consecutive amendments of the 
Employment Insurance Act in 1998, only those part-time employees working less than 80 
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hours a month and daily workers employed for less than a month remained ‘legally’ excluded 
from EIS coverage. 
However, the extension of EIS coverage had a very limited effect on protecting the 
unemployed in that simply being enrolled did not suffice for UI benefit eligibility. Under the 
old rules, one must be involuntarily laid off after having contributed insurance premiums for 
more than 12 out of the previous 18 months to qualify for UI benefits. With these 
requirements, however, short-term contract workers (those whose employment contract 
period is less than a year) and other unstably employed workers at small firms found it 
difficult to be eligible for UI benefits. To better protect those marginal workers and newly 
enrolled employees, the government relaxed its eligibility conditions, including the easing of 
the minimum contribution requirement from 12 out of the previous 18 months to 180 days 
out of the previous 12 months. 
The duration period of UI benefits varied depending on the enrollee’s employment period 
and the claimant’s age. The range was from a minimum of 60 days to a maximum of 210 
days. However, since Korea's EIS was implemented only on July 1, 1995, the insured period 
of employees could not exceed five years; thus, the actual duration of UI benefits could not 
exceed 150 days until June 30, 2000. 
Given the limited benefit duration and the unprecedented unfavorable labor market 
situation, the extended benefit rule was put into operation from July, 1998 so that the 
qualified unemployed could receive up to 60 days more than the period designated by the 
benefit duration matrix. Further, the UI benefit duration matrix from 60 to 210 days was 
modified to 90 to 240 days (Table 3), with the new matrix going into effect in January, 2000. 
In essence, the average duration of unemployment benefits increased to 126 days in 1999 
from 85 days in 1997 and 91 days in 1998. 
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Table 2. Coverage extension of the EIS 
Date Unemployment Insurance Component 
Employment Subsidy 
Component &  
Job Training Component 
July 1, 1995 ≥ 30 employees ≥  70 employees 
January 1, 1998 ≥ 10 employees ≥  50 employees 
March 1, 1998 ≥  5 employees ≥  50 employees 
July 1, 1998 ≥  5 employees ≥   5 employees 
October 1, 1998 ≥  1 employee ≥   1 employee 
Source: Ministry of Labor (2001a) 
 
Table 3. Benefit duration matrix 
(unit: days) 
 Insured Employment Period 
Less than 
1 year 
1-3 years 3-5 years 5-10 years Over 10 
years 
Age of 
the 
Claimant 
Below 30 90 90 120 150 180 
30-50 90 120 150 180 210 
Over 50 and 
Handicapped 90 150 180 210 240 
 
2) Job training for reemployment 
Programs in the job training component of the EIS provided accommodations for the 
unemployed to enhance their job skills and thus increase their employability by providing 
retraining opportunities for the unemployed. Since the outbreak of the economic crisis, the 
EIS expanded its training programs for the unemployed. In 1998, about 163,000 unemployed 
participated in and benefited from EIS job training programs for the unemployed, 
approximately eight times as many as those who had participated in the preceding year. The 
expenditure for these programs amounted to 191 billion won. In 1999, the EIS provided 
training opportunities for 171 thousand jobless workers with a budget of 307 billion won. In 
2000, 132 thousand unemployed workers participated in training programs, at an expenditure 
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of 216 billion won. On average, 48.6 percent of job trainees for reemployment benefited from 
the job training component of the EIS (Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Job training for reemployment 
(Unit: billion won, thousand persons) 
 
1998 1999 2000 
Expenditure Beneficiaries Expenditure Beneficiaries Expenditure Beneficiaries 
Training for 
Reemployment 
by the EIS 
191.0 163 306.7 171 215.5 132 
Training for 
Reemployment, 
Total 
656.8 363 514.4 371 440.3 222 
Source: Korea Employment Information Service, Employment Insurance database. 
Ministry of Labor (2001b). 
 
Those unemployed workers who had been employed at firms covered by the EIS were 
eligible to apply for these reemployment training programs and received training allowances 
that lasted from one month to one year, up to a total of three times, until they were able to 
obtain a new job. Training allowances were cut in half if participants continued to partake in 
the second training course and were reduced to zero for participation in the third training 
course. 
Training allowances ranged from 200,000 to 300,000 won (equivalent to 60-90 percent of 
the minimum wage at that time). Trainees who were learning skills for non-favored jobs, 
which had been faced with a labor shortage amidst the deep recession, received additional 
bonuses. Similar training opportunities, financed by the general government budget, were 
given to those unemployed who had not been enrolled by the EIS. Therefore, substantial 
opportunities for vocational training were provided to all of the unemployed. 
Job training programs for the unemployed offered opportunities for enhancing future 
employability to those out of work so that they could re-train themselves, while training 
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allowances helped alleviate their immediate economic difficulties. That is, apart from the 
formal purpose of job training, such programs served as a type of social safety net – those 
unemployed who could not receive cash benefits participated in job training programs and 
received training allowances. 
 
3) Employment Subsidies 
Subsidy programs were implemented via the employment maintenance/promotion 
component of the EIS. Employment maintenance subsidies intended to minimize 
employment adjustments through dismissals by providing wage subsidies to firms that made 
efforts to avoid laying-off redundant workers. In order to be subsidized, firms needed to be in 
a situation in which employment reduction was inevitable for managerial reasons and had to 
adopt subsidisable practices such as: (1) a temporary suspension of business, (2) a reduction 
of working hours, (3) the provision of training to redundant workers, (4) the provision of 
paid/unpaid leave, and (5) the dispatch or reassignment of workers. Subsidies equivalent to 
one-half to two-thirds (depending on the size of the firm) of the wages or allowances paid to 
their workers were refunded for a maximum of 6 months.  
Table 5. EIS employment subsidies 
(Unit: million won, persons) 
 1998 1999 2000 Expenditure Beneficiaries Expenditure Beneficiaries Expenditure Beneficiaries 
Employment 
Maintenance 
Subsidies 
74,223 654,375 79,197 369,591 29,297 148,246 
Hiring 
Subsidies 5,878 169 75,888 101,550 42,204 63,407 
Employment 
Promotion 
Subsidies 
16,186 120,721 29,149 198,783 42,148 233,426 
Total 96,287 775,265 184,234 669,924 113,649 445,079 
Source: Korea Employment Information Service, Monthly Statistics of Employment Insurance. 
 
31 
 
The requirements of employment maintenance subsidies were relaxed during the crisis and 
the assistance level was increased to provide more incentives and to cover more firms and 
workers. In 1998, a total of 74.2 billion won was paid for the employment maintenance of 
about 0.7 million workers, while in 1999, 79.2 billion won was spent for a total of 0.4 million 
workers. With the improving labor market situation in 2000, employment maintenance 
expenditures decreased to 29.3 billion won, covering 0.15 million beneficiaries (Table 5). 
Subsidy programs were first criticized by some economists on the grounds that they might 
hamper or delay structural adjustment of the economy by subsidizing marginal firms that had 
lost competitiveness in the market. However, subsidized firms were not necessarily marginal 
firms destined to end up in bankruptcy. Sound firms could face temporary cash flow 
difficulties in the midst of the financial crisis as financial institutions did not function 
properly. In addition, since firms were free to decide whether to make use of subsidy 
programs or lay off redundant workers, there were no a priori reasons to believe that the 
subsidy programs prevented firms from restructuring. Thus, subsidy programs were 
advocated and maintained as an important element of labor market policy. In fact, according 
to Hwang (1999), firms with good employees tended to utilize the employment maintenance 
subsidies. 
However, it is important that the contribution of employment subsidies in reducing 
unemployment not be exaggerated. The number of workers that benefited from the program 
was, on average, around 25,000 per month in 1998-99. Kim et al., (1999) analyzed the 
employment maintenance effects of employment subsidy programs using employer surveys 
as well as case studies. The estimated effect was 22.3 percent on average, which implied that 
the deadweight loss was in the 70 percent range. According to an assessment of PES staff and 
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monitoring reports, the deadweight loss and substitution effects of the 'grants to promote 
employment of displaced workers' had been substantial (Hwang, 1999; Kim et al., 1999).  
The two other subsidy programs in the employment maintenance/promotion component of 
the EIS were hiring subsidies and employment promotion subsidies, which were intended to 
assist disadvantaged workers of the labor market such as those involuntarily laid off, elderly 
workers, female workers, female household heads, and the long-term unemployed. 
 
4) Public Employment Services and the Labor Market Information System 
With the surge in unemployment benefit claimants, the number of public employment 
service staff was insufficient to administer even the UI benefit payment service. Immediate 
expansion of PES capacity to meet the demand for both benefit payment and administration 
of other active labor market programs was deemed urgent. The government dramatically 
increased the number of PES agencies from 53 to 149 and the number of PES counselors 
from 141 to 1,919 between 1997 and 2000 (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Evolution of the number of PES agencies and staff 
(Unit: offices, persons) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Offices 53 134 144 149 
Staff 107 1,296 1,825 1,919 
Note: The number of staff reflects only counselors for serial consistency. 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor. 
 
In 1998, to improve the quality of employment services and promote a customer-friendly 
environment, the government combined the employment insurance division and the job 
information service division of local labor offices into PES centers called “Employment 
Security Centers.” These centers were based on the concept of “one-stop service” to provide 
job seekers with information about job vacancies and vocational training information as well 
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as UI benefit payment services all in the same place. The government also eased regulations 
on job brokerage by private agencies and strengthened its support of free job placement 
services to trade unions and employers’ organizations. 
Although remarkable progress was made in the Korean PES during the three consecutive 
years after the economic crisis in 1997, the capacity of the Korean PES still remained 
insufficient to play an active role in meeting labor market needs. Rather, it had made the 
government realize that future policy tasks would be required to effectively meet the 
demands of job searchers via the PES. For example, strengthening ‘counseling’ services in a 
proper sense based on improvement of counselors’ expertise, development of a new 
occupational classification system that would serve more effectively in job matching, and 
collaboration with private sector employment service agencies, were listed as some of the 
remaining areas that needed to be addressed. 
As for the labor market information system, the government launched an electronic system 
in May 1999 called “Work-Net” benchmarking Canada’s “WorkInfoNet.” Work-Net, 
accessible on the Internet, provided various information on job vacancies, vocational training 
programs, career guidance, employment policies, employment insurance services, labor 
market statistics, and labor laws. Almost all job vacancies registered at public employment 
agencies could be found on Work-Net unless employers refused to allow the information to 
be uploaded. In order to make the system more effective and easier to use, the government 
planned to introduce a number of improvements including faster access speed and more user-
friendly interface, the development of job vacancy information based on new occupational 
classification, the provision of detailed information on labor market trends, and employment 
outlook and wages. 
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3. The global financial crisis in 2008 and recent developments in the EIS 
 
The financial crisis in 1997 played a crucial role in settling the EIS. Above all, the number 
of enrolled persons and unemployment benefit beneficiaries has continued to increase. Due to 
the refined and extended EIS, over a million unemployed benefited from unemployment 
benefits in 2009 when the Korean economy was attacked by the global financial crisis. As the 
number of beneficiaries increased, the recipient ratio, defined as ratio of UI beneficiaries with 
respect to total unemployment, increased from 8.5% in 2000 to 40.0% in 2010 (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. The number of enrolled persons and beneficiaries 
(Unit: thousand persons) 
 
Note: The left axis represents the number of beneficiaries and the right axis represents the 
number of enrolled persons. 
 
With most firms in the scope of the EIS, the economy-wide work sharing plan initiated by 
the quadripartite meeting could be supported more effectively by the EIS subsidy programs. 
In January, 2009, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions and Korea Employers Federation 
proposed a quadripartite meeting, in which not only employers and trade unions but also the 
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government and NGO representatives could attend, to establish countermeasures against the 
crisis. After a sequence of intensive meetings (seven official meetings, an open forum and a 
workshop until February 15, 2009), the quadripartite meeting members adopted a social pact 
on February 23, 2009. The pact articulated the responsibilities of workers, employers, 
government, and NGOs such as: i) work sharing efforts of both workers and employers, ii) 
government’s support to workers and employers, iii) roles of NGOs, iv) job creation and 
extension of the social safety net and v) the social diffusion of the consensus and action 
programs.  
Consequently to ‘the Quadripartite Pact for Overcome Economic Crisis,’ which defined the 
responsibility of workers, employers, government, and civil organizations, workers not only 
refrained from claims for wage increase but also turned in their wages and salaries for work 
sharing while employers maintained their employment either by instituting working time 
reductions, leave, temporary closing, etc. Through these means, the overall wage growth was 
pretty much moderated. To support the efforts of workers and employers, the government 
eased the eligibility conditions of the job maintenance subsidy and raised the benefit levels 
from two-thirds of wages to three-fourths of wages. To support the effort of social partners, 
the government provided tax incentives to both employers and workers. One of the 
supporting measures of the government was to recognize 50% of turned-in wages and salaries 
as cost of firms while workers were given income tax deduction for 50% of turned-in wages 
and salaries. In calculating retirement allowance and unemployment benefits, pre-crisis level 
wages were applied as far as it was advantageous to workers. Also, in many government 
programs such as credit guarantees and subsidies for training, those firms which fulfilled the 
pact were given priorities. 
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However, despite all the achievements, the nation's social safety net for the unemployed is 
still riddled with holes, which can be evidenced, for example, from the fact that the recipient 
ratio is far lower than other OECD countries (Figure 7). The number of PES staff has 
increased to three thousand, but this is still insufficient. 
 
Figure 7. International comparison of recipient ratios (UI beneficiaries with respect to 
total unemployment) 
  (Unit: %) 
 
Note: 1) The ratio is an average of 2005-09 for Korea and average of 2000-04 for all other 
countries. 
     2) UA designates unemployment assistance. 
3) UI designates unemployment insurance. 
Source: Korea’s ratio is calculated by the author based on Statistics Korea’s Economically 
Active Population Survey and Korea Employment Information Service’s Monthly 
Statistics of Employment Insurance. 
The other ratios are from Brusentsev and Vroman (2007). 
 
As of 2010, there were 17.2 million wage workers in the Korean labor market. Of these, 
only 10.7 million employees (62.6 percent of wage workers) were enrolled in jobs that would 
qualify them for UI benefits in the event of unemployment. The gap in coverage comes from 
two sources: employees who are supposed to be covered but are not, and employees who are 
not supposed to be covered legally under the present law. Even if the latter is taken into 
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consideration the ratio remains 72.5% (Table 7). Thus, one of the major problems with 
Korea's unemployment insurance is that even though Korea extended the scope of the EIS to 
all firms, that coverage still remains incomplete. The main source of the gap is low-wage 
earners and non-regular workers in small firms who are not properly reported to the labor 
administration. 
 
Table 7. Coverage of the EIS 
(Unit: thousand persons, %) 
 Total 
employment 
(A) 
Employees 
(B) 
Employees 
to be 
enrolled by 
the law (C) 
Actual no. 
of enrolled 
employees 
(D) 
(D/A)
×100 
(D/B)
×100 
(D/C)
×100 
2000 21,042 13,548 9,586 6,747 32.1 49.8 70.4 
2010 23,684 17,154 14,811 10,731 45.3 62.6 72.5 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Economically Active Population Survey and 
Monthly Statistics of Employment Insurance. 
 
In order to fill in the holes of the safety net, the government has recently taken a measure 
to subsidize the social insurance premiums of low wage workers. To those low wage workers 
in companies with less than ten employees, one-third to one-half of the Employment 
Insurance premium and National Pension premiums will be given if the employer requests 
them. For those workers whose monthly wages or salaries are less than 1.05 million won, a 
half of the insurance premiums will be given to the employers. To those whose monthly 
wages or salaries fall within the interval between 1.05 million and 1.25 million won, a third 
of the insurance premiums will be given. This will go into effect from July, 2012 and is 
meant as an incentive measure to encourage employers to report undeclared workers to the 
social insurance administration without any enforcement measures. This initiative seems to 
be more likely to have no effect than to induce undeclared workers to be reported without 
enforcement measures or collection of insurance premium in the form of withholding tax, 
which would require a considerable reform in taxation system. 
38 
 
Even if the capacity of the PES has been expanded quantitatively during the economic 
crisis in 1997 and following years, PES counselors could not afford much time in actual in-
depth counseling. Rather, they were preoccupied with such activities as the registration of 
workers’ records, recording job vacancies, and processing the unemployment benefit claims 
of workers and subsidy claims of firms. As the PES gave top priority to processing UI benefit 
claims rather than job placement, most job placement services were handled by private sector 
agencies and on websites of private dot-com companies. Work-Net was improved 
continuously to enable the provision of job-placement services with relatively little staff 
involvement. One hundred and forty-nine employment security centers were reorganized and 
consolidated into to eighty-one centers. They were moved to major transportation points and 
renovated with much modernized facilities and space. Despite all these reforms in PES and 
the labor market information system, the increase of PES staff was constrained by the central 
government because of ‘the small government principle’ and the number of PES staff still 
remained insufficient (Table 8). 
Table 8. The Number of PES staff 
(Unit: thousand persons; persons) 
  No. of PES staff (A) 
Labor force 
(B) 
Unemploy
ment (C) 
No. of  labor 
market 
participants per 
PES staff (B/A) 
No. of the 
unemployed per 
PES staff (C/A) 
Germany(2011)             113  
        
41,684  
          
3,140  
            
369 
              
28  
UK(2008)               80  
        
31,125  
          
1,783  
            
389 
              
22  
Canada(2011)               16  
        
18,525  
          
1,484  
          
1,158  
              
93  
USA(2008)               70  
      
154,287  
          
8,924  
          
2,204  
            
127  
Japan(2008)               25  
        
65,900  
          
2,650  
          
2,636  
            
106  
Korea(2011)                 5  
        
25,420  
            
825  
          
5,330 
            
173  
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor. 
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It was only from 2005 that the Korean government began to expand PES. To increase the 
number of staff for the Job Centers, 620 counselors were newly recruited from 2006 to 2007.  
Meantime, from 2006, intensive counseling, called ‘customized employment services,’ was 
provided to jobseekers in order to assess the capabilities of the job seeker and to establish a 
subsequent individual action plan. The customized service aimed to provide job placement 
service for individual job seekers in a step-by-step manner. Such services helped identify 
employment services which should be catered to vulnerable or disadvantaged job seekers. In 
2006, the “YES (Youth Employment Service)” program was adopted. 
In 2009, the Korean government introduced an ‘active’ labor market integration program, 
called “Job Finding Success Package.” Based on a critical review of social security reform in 
European countries, the Job Finding Success Package was prepared by the Korea Labor 
Institute and the Ministry of Employment and Labor from the second half of 2007. Based on 
the report submitted by the Korea Labor Institute, the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
started an implementation plan in 2008. This was a New Deal-type program in Britain and 
targeted vulnerable groups in the labor market. Based on individualized consultation, the 
program offered customized training and placement services depending on the capacity of job 
seekers. An allowance was given to each participant if s/he succeeds in finding a job at the 
end of the program. Participation was voluntary, but the participants were obliged to follow 
the ‘Package’ starting from an intensive counseling. This was a means-test-based program: 
even if a participant was not enrolled in the EIS, s/he was entitled to receive the package 
service as long as s/he belonged to a low-income family as defined by the law. The ‘Package’ 
program was implemented tentatively in 2009 for 9,831 participants. As the capacity of the 
PES was limited, the Ministry of Employment and Labor appealed to in-sourcing and 
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outsourcing of employment services. Private employment service companies and non-profit 
organizations participated in implementing the ‘Package’ program.  
The tentative program turned out to be successful. The job finding rate of participants 
amounted to 54.1%. The program was extended, and the number of participants increased to 
over sixty thousand in 2011(Table 9). Based on the experience of running the Job Finding 
Success Package, a similar program, called Finding New Job program, has been extended to 
middle- and old-age workers (aged 40 to 64) in 2012. Also, the YES (Youth Employment 
Service) program, which was introduced in 2006, was modified in accordance with the New 
Job Finding program (Table 10). The three programs are not financed by the EIS, but the PES 
of the EIS plays a crucial role in coordinating and delivering the programs. These three 
employment services with activation programs were possible because of the build-up of 
institutions and accumulation of knowledge on employment services since the late 1990s. 
However, as the number of participants increased beyond the capacity of PES, some 
outsourced services were not appropriately managed. A minute evaluation will be made in 
2012 so that the government takes an improvement measure. 
 
Table 9. The number of participants and job finding rate of Job Finding Success 
Package 
(Unit: persons, %) 
  2009 2010  2011  
 Number of 
participants  9,831 25,132 63,728 
 Job finding rate  54.1 60.4 65.2 
Note: Job finding rate is defined as a rate of success within twelve months which is the 
maximum duration of ‘Package’ program per participant. 
Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor. 
 
 
41 
 
 
Table 10.  Employment services with activation programs 
 
Job Finding Success 
Package program New Job Finding program  
YES (Youth Employment 
Service) program 
Target 
group 
Low income jobseekers at 
all age levels 
• Those belonging to the 
households with earnings 
less than 150% of 
minimum costs of living 
or beneficiaries of 
“National Basic 
Livelihood Security” who 
are capable of working 
• Homeless, North Korean 
refugee, youth in troubled 
family, and handicapped 
jobseekers 
Middle- and old- job seekers 
aged 40-64 
• Those belonging to the 
households with earnings less 
than 200% of minimum costs 
of living 
• Unemployed more than one 
month since receiving final 
unemployment benefits 
• Unemployed that have 
subscribed to employment 
insurance in the past but do 
not yet qualify for 
employment benefits 
• Jobseekers unemployed for 
the past six months or more 
Youths aged 15-29 
 
• Unemployed high school 
graduates 
• Unemployed college or 
university graduates who 
have not found a job for 
more than six months 
since graduation 
Services 
Stage 1: Diagnosis and career path-setting (three weeks to one month) 
• Participants receive intensive individual counseling from Job Centre counselors 
(employment consultants), and an assessment on their employment abilities, desire and 
techniques. 
• In accordance with the results of the evaluation, an Individual Action Plan is established, 
which includes services provided after the second stage. 
Stage 2: Improvement in vocational ability (max. 8 months; max. 6 months*) 
• Vocational training, jobs for experience, start-up programs, youth intern programs. 
Stage 3: Intensive job placement (max. 3 months; max. 2 months*) 
• Job Centre counselors accompany program participants to their job interviews and provide 
support. 
• Group interview sessions are held by participants and recruiting companies. 
Allowance Stage 1: KRW 200,000 per month Stage 2: KRW 200,000 per month, and KRW 116,000 when participating in vocational training 
Allowance 
payment  
period 
A maximum of 6 months 
Support to 
training 
costs 
Up to KRW 3 million via 
training voucher system 
Up to KRW 2 million,  
via training voucher system 
Incentives 
upon 
successful 
job finding 
Up to KRW 1 million as 
successful job finding 
allowance 
None 
Note: * Stage-2 and Stage-3 services are given up to eight months and three months in Job 
Finding Success Package program, and up to six months and two months for YES program 
and New Job Finding program respectively while allowance payment period is up to six 
months in all the three programs. 
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Besides the restructuring triggered by the crisis continues, and the structural adjustment of 
both the private and public sectors which inevitably affected the labor market, worldwide 
factors such as technological change and globalization have been forcing incessant 
adjustments to the labor market. The external labor market is rapidly developing in Korea, 
and the extent of traditional employment relations based on seniority is dwindling. Firms 
have less incentive than before to train employees who may soon leave for other firms. This 
new unstable environment is forcing the training system to allow for more worker initiatives 
than training-service providers or firms. Besides, adapting the training system to non-regular 
workers and workers in SMEs has become another important issue to be addressed because 
the participation of this population in the training was low under the existent regulations of 
the EIS. The Korean government introduced an individual learning account system from 
2009 so that non-regular workers could access more easily to learning programs and choose 
learning programs autonomously. This initiative was taken to cope with the asymmetrically 
low participation of non-regular workers in the training components of the EIS. However, 
this initiative played a role of anti-crisis measure in the midst of the global financial crisis. In 
fact, the financial crisis in 1997 hit regular workers as well as non-regular workers. In 
contrast, in 2009, it was mostly non-regular workers who were influenced by the shock. 
The deadweight effect in subsidy programs has long been the object of criticism. From 
2010, the Ministry of Employment and Labor changed the benefit rule of hiring subsidy 
programs. Before this change, subsidies were given to those firms which met predetermined 
conditions. However, now the Ministry invites firms to participate, and each firm submits a 
proposal. Only those selected firms which pass the screening process of the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor are given subsidies.  
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper first examined changes in the labor market condition and the evolution of policy 
instruments and then described how Korea’s active labor market’s policies were shaped and 
established. Most active labor market policy components are contained in or based on the 
Employment Insurance System. The financial crisis in 1997 and resulting labor market 
turmoil provided a critical incentive for the EIS to be fully extended. The emergency labor 
market policy responses in 2009 were possible and effective because of the build-up of labor 
market institutions in the past one and half decades. There are some interesting and 
meaningful lessons from the Korean experience. 
First, economic and social conditions must be mature enough before a country introduces a 
traditional type unemployment insurance and other active labor market policy measures 
based on it: the economy should be characterized by a sufficiently large portion of the 
modern sector so that most workers are employed in a continuous, not discrete, manner, 
working on a daily or seasonal basis, and the administrative capacity should be reasonable 
enough to control the moral hazards of unnecessarily extending the search period and to 
monitor the evasion of unreported work. This does not necessarily mean that all the labor 
market institution development or active labor market policy should follow a certain level of 
economic development. Korea had run training policy and public works program successfully 
without demanding strict employment records. Also, Korea had other institutional tools to 
protect the unemployed such as severance pay. However, a safety net for the unemployed 
requires good record keeping, which is enabled when the proportion of the modern industrial 
sector is sufficiently large. 
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In Korea, the contribution of the UI has been very limited in securing the livelihood of the 
unemployed. Also, of the four main social insurance schemes, people usually place the least 
importance on the UI. In contrast, compared to other social insurance schemes, the UI 
requires the most refined employment record-keeping infrastructure due to the very nature of 
its benefit rules. Therefore, where there is a large informal sector, UI coverage, as well as its 
role in protecting the unemployed, is limited because it is ultimately difficult to maintain the 
employment records of informal sector workers. Conversely, the UI and its scope of 
extension can provide momentum for an economy to transform a large proportion of its 
informal sector into the formal sector. Therefore, when a developing country introduces 
unemployment insurance is a matter that requires careful consideration. If the objective of 
introducing the UI is merely income support for the unemployed, individual savings accounts 
or severance pay schemes can be more efficient and effective options. 
Second, countries can respond more effectively and efficiently to unemployment and 
promote reemployment when active labor market policy programs are linked with 
unemployment benefits in a comprehensive institutional framework than they can when the 
system relies mainly on traditional unemployment benefits. Although resources to implement 
active labor market policies are usually financed through a general budget, fund-type 
financing may implement the built-in stabilizer role more effectively. Korea accumulated the 
employment insurance fund before the financial crisis and coped with the crisis more 
effectively in 1998 and 2009, when the Korean economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis 
and global financial crisis respectively. 
Third, if the infrastructure of the active labor market policy is solid, social protection 
systems can be run more equitably. When the Korean economy dipped into an unprecedented 
period of turmoil in 1998, hundreds of firms went bankrupt every day and unemployment 
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soared. Moreover, non-regular and low-educated workers suffered disproportionately. Jobs 
became insecure and core disadvantaged groups in the Korean labor market experienced 
recurrent unemployment, even if they did not fall into the long-term unemployment trap. 
Low-income families faced declining incomes and received less wage increases even with the 
ensuing economic recovery. Paradoxically, non-regular workers and employees in small 
businesses were excluded from social insurance coverage or were inappropriately covered in 
the capacity of the self-employed. Shortcomings of the existent social insurance system, 
including the EIS, became evident.  
Though only the employees of large companies (those employing more than 30 workers) 
were entitled to unemployment benefits when the EIS was introduced in 1995, the scope was 
rapidly extended to firms of all sizes after the onset of the financial crisis. Once the scope of 
the EIS was extended, other social insurance schemes followed the example of the EIS, such 
as the Work Injury Compensation Insurance and the Pay Guarantee Fund in July, 2000, the 
National Health Insurance in July, 2001 and the National Pension in 2002. Prior to 2001 and 
2002 respectively, the National Health Insurance and National Pension covered those workers 
in firms with less than 5 employees only in the capacity of self-employed, not as employees, 
demanding not only employee premiums but also employer premiums to workers. All this 
coverage expansion was stimulated by the extension of the EIS. 
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